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STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP
IN ONE PLACE, BUT NOT ANOTHER:
WHEN THE LAW ENCOURAGES
BREASTFEEDING IN PUBLIC WHILE
SIMULTANEOUSLY DISCOURAGING
IT AT WORK
Emily F. Suski*
ABSTRACT
In this Essay, the author takes a novel approach to the
topic of breastfeeding and work by exploring the trend among
states to exempt breastfeeding from criminal indecent expo-
sure laws and comparing this trend to the support, or lack
thereof, in laws and policy for breastfeeding at work. The au-
thor's comparison reveals that while there is a trend to support
breastfeeding in public, there is no such trend in the law to
support breastfeeding in the relatively more private work en-
vironment. The author argues that this disparity is both
counterintuitive and serves to limit women's choices regarding
breastfeeding and work. The author also provides an analysis
of the law, arguing that the government action with respect to
breastfeeding advances a particular public policy that limits
women's choices with respect to breastfeeding at work and
that furthers the already recognized divide between work and
family. The author concludes with suggestions for how the
government can and should use the already extant authority it
holds to intervene in private employment with respect to
breastfeeding and work and family policies to support work-
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UCLA WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 12:109
place breastfeeding and to break down the divide between
work and family.
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INTRODUCTION
While riding in an elevator recently, I overheard a conversa-
tion between two classmates who were shocked by the fact that
our teacher had breastfed her infant son as she taught.' My
1. This Essay will address the topic of breastfeeding and its relationship to the
larger issues of work and family as well as what the ideals of worker and mother
entail. Throughout, the term "breastfeeding" will refer to the process of feeding a
child directly from a woman's breast.
BREASTFEEDING AT WORK
classmates' comments and tones revealed a dichotomy in their
thought. They sanctioned the act of breastfeeding, but not the
place where our teacher chose to do it - at work. This bifur-
cated perception of breastfeeding - the idea that breastfeeding
should be done, but that it should not be done, except in certain
spaces - is hardly unique. It is an idea that even the law
supports.2
A number of recent articles and studies have been devoted
to the topic of breastfeeding - whether, how, and where it
should occur.3 Numerous studies and professional organizations
recognize and report the benefits of breastfeeding. 4 Breastfeed-
ing helps to protect children against disease and infection.
5 It
aids in the development of antibodies in infants' immune sys-
tems.6 Studies also indicate that it can increase the cognitive ca-
pabilities of children.7 Breastfeeding mothers benefit as well.
Breastfeeding helps to decrease the incidence of postpartum
blood loss in women.8 Women also experience a reduced risk of
ovarian and breast cancer as well as an increased sense of self-
esteem.9
2. See infra notes 23-24, 26, 29-30 and accompanying text.
3. The intersection of the law with respect to breastfeeding and work, for ex-
ample, was the topic of two articles in law reviews and journals in the Spring of 2001.
See Henry Wyatt Christup, Litigating a Breastfeeding and Employment Case in the
New Millenium, 12 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 263 (2000); Diana Kasdan, Reclaiming
Title VII and the PDA: Prohibiting Workplace Discrimination Against Breastfeeding
Women, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 309 (2001).
4. Gary L. Freed, Breastfeeding: Time to Teach What We Preach, 269 J. AM.
MED. Ass'N, 243, 243 (1993). The American Academy of Pediatrics, the American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, and the American Academy of Family
Physicians recommend breastfeeding. Id. at 243.
5. Ruth A. Lawrence, A Review of the Medical Benefits and Contraindications
to Breastfeeding in the United States, MATERNAL & CHILD HEALTH TECH. INFO.
BULL. (Nat'l Ctr. Educ. Maternal & Child Health), at 4-5 (1997). Breastfeeding pro-
tects against gastrointestinal, respiratory, and urinary tract infections. Breastfeeding
has also been linked to reduced risks of cancer, insulin-dependent diabetes, and ec-
zema in children. Id.
6. Id.
7. L. John Horwood & David M. Fergusson, Breastfeeding and Later Cognitive
and Academic Outcomes, American Academy of Pediatrics, Pediatrics, available at
http://www.pediatrics.org/cgi/content/full/101/1/e9 (last visited Mar. 15, 2001) (find-
ing that, when variable factors were controlled, children who were breastfed had
higher developmental scores and higher intelligence quotients than children who
were not breastfed).
8. See DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES OFFICE ON WOMEN'S
HEALTH, BLUEPRINT FOR ACTION ON BREASTFEEDING (2000) [hereinafter
BLUEPRINT].
9. Id.
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Recognizing the numerous benefits that children and their
mothers derive from breastfeeding, a number of public and pri-
vate organizations encourage women to breastfeed.10 Medical
manuals provide extensive training on breastfeeding for nurses,
doctors, medical students, and breastfeeding educators."1 La
Leche League International devotes itself to the promotion of
breastfeeding around the world.12 Additionally, the Surgeon
General has recently announced a "Blueprint" for the promotion
of breastfeeding nationwide. 13 Moreover, Congress has passed
legislation to acknowledge the many benefits of breastfeeding
and to announce national policy in support of it.14 The federal
legislation provides funding for programs to increase the rate of
breastfeeding across the United States.1 5
All of the support for and the promotion of breastfeeding
might seem to provide a veritable legal mandate for allowing
breastfeeding whenever and wherever it should need to occur.
Instead, however, the law mirrors the dichotomy in thought ex-
pressed by my classmates. The law encourages women to
10. See generally Freed, supra note 4.
11. E.g., MARIE BANCUZZO, BREASTFEEDING THE NEWBORN: CLINICAL STRAT-
EGIES FOR NURSES (1999); JUDITH LAUWERS ET AL., COUNSELING THE NURSING
MOTHER (3d ed. 2000); RUTH A. LAWRENCE & ROBERT M. LAWRENCE,
BREASTFEEDING: A GUIDE FOR THE MEDICAL PROFESSION (5th ed. 1999); JAN
RIORDAN, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO BREASTFEEDING (1991); JAN RIORDAN &
KATHLEEN AUERBACH, BREASTFEEDING AND HUMAN LACTATION (2d ed. 1999).
12. La Leche League International, What Is La Leche League International?, at
http://lalecheleague.org/whatisLLL.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2001). La Leche
League, founded in 1956, dedicates itself solely to encouraging and supporting
breastfeeding among women worldwide. Id.
13. BLUEPRINT, supra note 8, at 10-11 (noting that breastfeeding has been
shown to reduce the incidence of diarrhea, ear and respiratory infections as well as
polio, tetanus, diphtheria, asthma, and diabetes, and the Surgeon General has called
for support of breastfeeding in society and in the workplace). Specifically, the Sur-
geon General's Blueprint for Action on Breastfeeding states that "significant steps
must be taken to increase breastfeeding in the United States" and that "this goal can
only be achieved by supporting breastfeeding in the family, community, workplace,
health care sector, and society." Id. at 9.
14. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1771-1790 (1994). In particular, the Child Nutrition Act of
1966 states that breastfeeding is the "best method of infant nutrition." Id. at
§ 1790(a).
15. Id. at § 1790. The legislation calls for the development of programs to pro-
mote breastfeeding. The Child Nutrition Act specifies that public funds should be
used to develop breastfeeding education programs in hospitals and in health care
organizations. In other words, the federal money is to be used for health care pro-
fessionals to impress upon mothers the importance of breastfeeding immediately
postpartum in the hospital. Id. at § 1790(b)(3). Notably, then, the federal money is
being used to both promote breastfeeding and send a message to women about what
it means to be a good mother: a good mother breastfeeds her child(ren).
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breastfeed, but only in particular spaces. Given that breastfeed-
ing has traditionally been deemed a private, domestic activity,16
it might seem that if the law was going to support breastfeeding
in spaces outside of the home, then those spaces would be the
more private ones, such as the workplace. The opposite, how-
ever, is true. A relatively large number of states have laws that
expressly permit breastfeedng in public, 17 whereas only one state
has laws that require private employers to permit breastfeeding
in the workplace.'
By promoting breastfeeding while simultaneously failing to
support workplace breastfeeding policies, the law limits women's
choices. It encourages them to breastfeed, but only at home or in
public spaces. By taking this fragmented approach to breastfeed-
ing, supporting breastfeeding but failing to encourage it in the
workplace, the law helps to exclude women from work. It en-
courages, even pressures,' 9 women to participate in an activity
that very typically cannot be done at work. 20 The law provides
practically no recourse for women who need to or want to
breastfeed and work at the same time.21 Women can either con-
form to pressures of federal breastfeeding policies and laws and
breastfeed, or they can work. They cannot, however, do both
with the support of the law.
This Essay will attempt to deconstruct this situation. Part I
will compare trends in legislation and case law regarding
breastfeeding in public spaces to legislation and case law regard-
ing breastfeeding at work. This part will show that while many
states have followed a trend to exempt breastfeeding from crimi-
nal indecent exposure laws, no such trend to permit breastfeed-
ing at work has developed in the law. Part II will offer two
possible explanations for this situation. The first of these expla-
16. NAOMI BAUMSLAG & DAI L. MICELLES, MILK MONEY AND MADNESS 193
(1995). Historically women have been relegated to the domestic sphere where they
have had primary responsibility for many domestic activities such as child rearing
and meal provision. Id. at 193. Breastfeeding is a form of both child rearing and
meal provision. Id. at xxi. As such, it too has traditionally and persistently been
considered an activity appropriate only for the home or other private spaces. Id. at
202-03.
17. See infra notes 23-24, 26 and accompanying text.
18. HAW. REv. STAT. § 378-2 (1991) (an employer who refuses to hire a woman
or penalizes an employee in any way for breastfeeding has engaged in an "unlawful
discriminatory practice").
19. 42 U.S.C. § 1790.
20. See cases cited infra notes 88, 91.
21. See infra notes 30, 32.
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nations is that, given the nature and relative severity of criminal
sanctions, there exists a stronger public policy mandate for alter-
ing the criminal status of breastfeeding than for interfering with
employment sanctions for breastfeeding at work. The act of
breastfeeding, moreover, has arguable constitutional implications
that further justify eliminating the criminal punishments for the
act. Even if the criminal and employment sanctions were equally
severe, however, a problem would still exist with state regulation
of employment regarding breastfeeding in private workplaces.
Because private employers generally have the right to direct their
operations free of government regulation, the state must have a
significant public policy rationale to justify interfering with em-
ployers' rights of private control. 22 Thus, the second explanation
is that in the context of breastfeeding in the private workplace,
the state lacks a significant public policy justification for such in-
terference. Part III will then reject the first of these two explana-
tions as inaccurate with respect to breastfeeding. This part will
also argue that the second explanation is a deceptive justification:
the government, through case law and legislation regarding
breastfeeding generally and at work, does not take a non-in-
terventionist approach in the private sphere of the workplace
concerning work/family issues such as breastfeeding. Instead, it
furthers a particular policy regarding work and family issues.
Through case law and legislation, the state supports the existing
divide between work and family and the related ideal-worker
and ideal-mother paradigms that serve to exclude breastfeeding,
an act with arguable constitutional significance, from the work-
place and thereby limit women's choices regarding breastfeeding
and work/family issues generally. Part IV will suggest that since
the government's intervention in the realm of private employ-
ment regarding work/family issues defeats the argument that it
lacks authority to act on these issues, the state can take action to
dismantle the work/family divide and the ideal-mother norm.
This part will also suggest that this action should work to rede-
fine the ideal-worker norm such that it considers and accommo-
dates workers' care-taking responsibilities, which include, but are
not limited to, breastfeeding responsibilities. Finally, this part
will advance ways to advocate for and compel such state action.
22. See, e.g., Priddy v. City of Tulsa, 882 P.2d 81 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (hold-
ing that in order to protect individual liberty, the state can only regulate the private
sector if it is doing so to protect the public welfare).
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I. BREASTFEED ON THE STREET, BUT DON'T
Do IT AT WORK
The traditional notion that breastfeeding should only occur
in private is changing, and shifts in indecent exposure laws reflect
this. Currently, twenty-three states either expressly exclude
breastfeeding from the language of their indecent exposure stat-
utes,23 or specifically identify it as a permissible act in indepen-
dent statutes.24 In these states women can breastfeed in public
spaces with impunity.25 Moreover, thirteen other states define
indecent exposure such that exposure of the female breast, and
therefore, breastfeeding, arguably are not acts included in those
statutes.26 Breastfeeding in public is becoming a permissible act.
The same cannot be said for breastfeeding in the private
workplace. Women simply have little to no support under the
23. FLA. STAT. Ch. 800.03 (1993); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-9 (West 1984);
MINN. STAT. § 617.23 (1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-190.9 (1998); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 201.220 (1997);; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-45-1 (1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-511
(1999); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-702 (1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-387 (Michie
1994); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.88.010 (2000); Wis. STAT. § 944.20 (1996).
24. ALASKA STAT. § 29.25.080 (Michie 1998); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-64
(1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 31 § 310 (1997); HAW. REV. STAT. § 489-21 (2000); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 191.918 (West 1999); MoNr. CODE ANN § 50-19-501 (1999); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 132:10-d (1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:4B-4 (West 1997); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 28-20-1 (Michie 1999); N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS LAW §79-e (McKinney 1994); OR.
REV. STAT. § 109.001 (1999); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 165.002
(Vernon 1995). The language in five of these states' statutes indicates that a woman
is "entitled" to breastfeed in any public or private space. ALASKA STAT. § 29.25.080
(Michie 1998); Mo. REV. STAT. § 191.918 (West 1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-20-1
(Michie 1999); N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS LAW §79-e (McKinney 1994); TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. §165.002 (West 1995). States' limited authority to intervene in
the operations of private employment coupled with the rather permissive nature of
this language indicates that this language does not amount to a mandate to private
employers to permit breastfeeding at work. Instead, it is nothing more than an ac-
knowledgement of the rights of private employers to direct the operations of their
businesses. If this direction happens to permit breastfeeding, the language of these
statutes indicates that the state takes no issue with that particular employment pol-
icy. In short, these statutes provide no assistance to women who need to breastfeed
at work. See cases cited infra note 61.
25. See supra notes 23-24.
26. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-68 (1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7-302 (1995); IDAHO
Code § 18-4116 (Michie 1996); IOWA CODE § 709.9 (1978); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 510.150 (Michie 1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. T. 17-A § 854 (1997); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 28-806 (1977); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-12.1 (1979); 18 PA. STAT. ANN.
§ 3127 (1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-24-1.2 (Michie 1998); W. VA. CODE § 61-8-
9 (1992). The above cited statutes define indecent exposure as the exposure of the
genitals. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-112 (Michie 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3508
(1998). The above cited statutes define indecent exposure as an exposure of the sex
organs.
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law for making a decision to both breastfeed and work, that is, to
breastfeed at work. Statutes27 and cases28 regarding breastfeed-
ing at work overwhelmingly support private employment policies
that prohibit women from breastfeeding at work. Only one state,
Hawaii, has enacted a statute that bars employers from penaliz-
ing employees based on their decisions to breastfeed at work.2 9
Four other states - Georgia, Minnesota, Tennessee, and Texas
- offer varying levels of support for women who want to express
breast milk at work. 30 They provide no support, however, for
women who choose to breastfeed at work.31
Case law regarding breastfeeding at work indicates an even
bleaker situation. Cases on the topic provide little to no support
for breastfeeding at work.32 The single case from the Eleventh
27. For example, even the few states that have laws offering some support for
expressing breast milk at work limit the responsibilities of the employer. Employers
in Georgia, Tennessee, and Minnesota do not have to provide time for the expres-
sion of breast milk if it would "unduly disrupt" the workplace. See infra note 30 and
accompanying text.
28. See cases cited infra note 32.
29. HAw. REV. STAT. § 378-2 (1991).
30. GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1-6 (1999); MINN. STAT. § 181.939 (1998); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 50-1-305 (1999); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 165.003 (Vernon,
1995). Only Minnesota and Tennessee go so far as to require that employers provide
a place and "reasonable, unpaid" break time to express breast milk. MINN. STAT.
§ 181.939 (1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-305 (1999). The Minnesota and Tennes-
see statutes, which are virtually identical, go on to state that if providing this break
time "unduly disrupts" the operations of the employer, then the employer does not
have to provide the break time. Notably, the Minnesota and Tennessee statutes are
new. Enacted in 1998 and 1999, respectively, their standards (however generous)
have not yet been subjected to interpretation. The Georgia and Texas workplace
breast pumping statutes offer even less support. GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1-6 (1999);
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 165.003 (Vernon 1995). The Georgia statute
only states that employers "may" provide a reasonable, unpaid break for expressing
breast milk. The Texas statute simply directs the Texas Department of Health to
make recommendations to employers that they should support breastfeeding and
breast pumping at work. Neither the Texas nor the Georgia statute imposes an obli-
gation on employers to actually provide time to breastfeed or express breast milk.
31. GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1-6 (1999); MINN. STAT. § 181.939 (1998); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 50-1-305 (1999); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 165.003 (West 1995).
32. See Baker v. Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs., 685 N.E.2d 1325, 1326-27
(Ohio Ct. App. 1996). In Baker, the court upheld a denial of an employee's unem-
ployment compensation claim after she quit work because she was prohibited from
breastfeeding there. The court asserted that her actions did not constitute just cause
to quit. Id.; see also Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., 951 F.2d 351, 351 (W.D.Ky. 1991)
(holding that firing an employee who took unauthorized leave to breastfeed her
baby, a baby who refused bottles, did not give rise to a valid sex discrimination
claim); Bd. of Sch. Dir. of Fox Chapel Area Sch. Dist. v. Rossetti, 411 A.2d 486, 488-
89 (Pa. 1979) (holding that firing a mother from her job as a teacher because she
took leave to breastfeed her infant did not constitute unlawful discrimination on the
basis of sex).
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Circuit Court of Appeals that not only supported breastfeeding
at work, but also found the act of breastfeeding to be a protected
Constitutional right, has never been followed. 33 Instead, it has
been limited. 34
At a glance, then, the law regarding where a woman can
breastfeed seems inconsistent. In at least twenty-two states, wo-
men can lawfully perform this traditionally private, domestic ac-
tivity on public streets. In the typical private workplace, which is
a smaller, more private space, however, women have no protec-
tion from penalties for breastfeeding - unless, of course, they
live in Hawaii. 35
II. Two PURPORTED EXPLANATIONS
There are two possible explanations for this difference be-
tween the state's actions with respect to indecent exposure and
employment laws. The first of these purported explanations is
that the state has a strong public policy justification for eliminat-
ing the relatively severe penalties attached to public breastfeed-
ing. The second purported explanation is that the state lacks any
sufficiently strong justification for interfering with employment
penalties for breastfeeding. Fully explaining these possible rea-
sons requires a discussion of the severity and nature of criminal
versus employment penalties as well as a discussion of the au-
thority and justifications for government intrusion on the rights
of private employers to control their businesses.
A. The Severity and Nature of Criminal Sanctions
Criminal sanctions result when the state brings an action
against an individual for purportedly committing a crime that of-
fends the state and its people.36 Conviction of a crime amounts
to public censure.37 It also carries with it the possibility of mone-
tary fines and a loss of freedom by incarceration. 38
33. Dike v. Sch. Bd. of Orange County Fla., 650 F.2d 783 (Former 5th Cir.
1981).
34. See Ploski v. Feder, No. C98-2392CRB, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2229, at *12-
14 (N.D. Cal. March 1, 1999) (holding that, if a constitutional right to breastfeed
exists, it does not exist on the facts of this case in which a Child Protective Services
workers prevented a mother from breastfeeding because the drugs she was taking
could contaminate her breast milk).
35. HAw. REV. STAT. § 378-2 (1991).
36. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 1.3 at 12 (West Group, 3d ed. 2000).
37. Id. at 12.
38. Id.
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The state defines certain acts as "crimes" and subjects those
acts to severe penalties in an attempt to prevent individuals from
behaving in a way that society deems objectionable or danger-
ous. 39 The process of defining an act as "criminal," then, forces
the state to interpret the public perception of that act.40 Given
the severity of criminal sanctions and the reason for their sever-
ity, a positive shift in social norms regarding a criminal act justi-
fies state action to decriminalize it.4 1 In other words, once the
public gives some indication that an act is no longer objectiona-
ble, the state can justify eliminating the severe criminal penalties
attached to it.42
Such a shift in public perception has occurred with respect to
breastfeeding. Federal law,43 as well as a number of organiza-
tions dedicated to maternal and infant health, strongly encourage
women to breastfeed.44 Given that indecent exposure laws are
codified in state criminal codes and often exempt breastfeed-
ing, 45 the changes in the public perception regarding breastfeed-
ing have contributed to public pressure on the state to support
breastfeeding. 46 This pressure has led to efforts to eliminate the
punitive, criminal consequences associated with it.4 7
The decision to breastfeed and the act of breastfeeding ar-
guably are of Constitutional stature, which only fortifies the
state's justification for decriminalizing breastfeeding. 48 The deci-
39. Id. at 22.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1790 (1994). This section of the Child Nutrition Act is entitled
"Breastfeeding Promotion Program." Its stated purpose is to "promote breastfeed-
ing as the best method of infant nutrition." 42 U.S.C. § 1790(a).
44. See BLUEPRINT, supra note 8, at 9; Freed, supra note 4; La Leche League
International, supra note 12.
45. E.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-1402 (1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:106.1
(West, Westlaw through 2000 Legis. Sess.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.11 § 764 (1953);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 245.01 (McKinney 1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-511 (1999).
46. Once the public learns about stories of women who have been threatened
with criminal fines for breastfeeding in public, the public outcry in support of
breastfeeding pressures the government to support it. Women have held "nurse-
ins," demonstrations in support of breastfeeding, to vividly create this pressure on
the government so that the state will support breastfeeding. E.g., Mother's Outrage
Prompts Bill on the Right to Nurse in Public, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1997, at A47.
47. Id.; see also LAFAVE, supra note 36, at 12.
48. Dike v. Sch. Bd. Of Orange County Fla., 650 F.2d. 783, 787 (Former 5th
Circ. 1981) (holding that breastfeeding is a constitutionally protected liberty interest
by comparing breastfeeding to other family-related privacy and liberty interests pro-
tected under the Constitution).
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sion to breastfeed and the act of breastfeeding are comparable to
fundamental liberty interests recognized in Pierce v. Society of
Sisters49 and Griswold v. Connecticut.5 0 In Pierce, the Supreme
Court invalidated a state law requiring that children attend only
public schools.51 The Court held that the right of parents to care
for and control their children is a fundamental liberty right pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment.52 The decision to
breastfeed has considerable, long-term implications that affect a
child's physical health.5 3 Breastfeeding helps to prevent myriad
diseases, including cancer, diabetes, and asthma.5 4 It also has
been shown to significantly affect the cognitive development of
children.55 At least one study has shown that breastfed children
have higher intelligence quotients than non-breastfed children
do.5 6 Parents' rights to control the decision to breastfeed, then,
have as much, if not more, of an effect on the long-term well-
being of their children than do parents' decisions regarding the
education of their children. The decision to breastfeed, therefore,
arguably constitutes a child rearing decision that is no less signifi-
cant than the constitutionally protected decision to send one's
child to a particular school.
In Griswold, the Supreme Court recognized that the marital
relationship is an intimate association that the Constitution pro-
tects from unnecessary government interference.5 7 Breastfeed-
ing, like marriage, is also an intimate relationship.58 Its intimacy
is rooted in the nutritional, emotional, and psychological bonds
that develop during the process of breastfeeding.5 9 Thus, the ar-
guable Constitutional significance of breastfeeding, the recog-
nized health, developmental and cognitive implications, and the
relative severity of the criminal sanctions for public breastfeeding
49. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
50. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
51. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534.
52. Id.
53. See BLUEPRINT, supra note 8, at 11.
54. See id; Lawrence, supra note 5, at 4-5.
55. See Horwood & Fergusson, supra note 7.
56. Id.
57. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
58. See BAUMSLAG & MICELLES, supra note 16, at xxi.
59. Id. Breastfeeding is an "interactive process whereby mother and child work
together." The process "nourishes the infant, protects both mother and child from a
plethora of diseases, and establishes a warm and loving relationship between them."
Id.
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offer the state ample justification for abolishing any state-im-
posed criminal penalties for breastfeeding in public.
Because employment sanctions arguably are substantially
less severe than criminal sanctions, 60 however, the state needs a
more significant policy justification for interfering with them
than it needs for altering the criminal penalties it imposes on cer-
tain acts.61 An individual faces sanctions such as demotion- or
dismissal in the workplace, 62 but does not face imprisonment or
the public censure that result from a violation of a criminal law.63
Employment sanctions also do not subject the individual to the
risk of direct monetary fines.64 Even infringements on constitu-
tionally protected interests by private employers do not warrant
state interference against these comparatively minor employ-
ment sanctions. 65 Thus, the mere indication that public percep-
tion has shifted regarding breastfeeding, even when it arguably
involves Constitutional liberty interests, seemingly does not con-
stitute a sufficiently strong reason for the state to interfere with
the relatively minimal private employment sanctions that may re-
sult from breastfeeding at work.
B. Private Employers' Rights to Control Workplaces Free from
State Interference
While the state effectuates and controls criminal sanctions,66
it does not generate private employment sanctions, which result
60. See, e.g., Martinez v. N.B.C., Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 305, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(involving a mother who had to take a demotion in order to pump breast milk and
accommodate her other family responsibilities). Pedrix-Wang v. Dir. Employment
Servs. Dep't, 856 S.W.2d 636, 640 (Ark. App. 1993) (involving a mother who quit
her job after her employer offered her a demotion in response to her request for
workplace accommodations whereby she could breastfeed without exposing her to
chemicals that could compromise the integrity of her breast milk).
61. See, e.g., Priddy v. City of Tulsa, 882 P.2d 81 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (hold-
ing that the state's authority to intervene in the operations of private employers is
limited such that it can only be exercised to protect the public welfare); Allinder v.
City of Homewood, 49 So. 2d 108 (Ala. 1950) (holding that the state can regulate
private business but only in the interest of the general welfare).
62. See cases cited supra note 60.
63. LAFAVE, supra note 36, at 12.
64. See cases cited supra note 60.
65. MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL. EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.1 (2d ed. 1999). Private
employers, particularly if they are at-will employers, have authority to limit the Con-
stitutional rights of their employees. Id. For example, employers can limit employ-
ees' First Amendment rights to free speech by imposing dress codes. Id. They can
also limit their employees' Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures by imposing drug testing. Id. at § 4.6.
66. LAFAVE, supra note 36, at 13.
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from a violation of policies developed by private employers.67
Private employers not only have the right to create their own
employment policies and direct the operations of their busi-
nesses, but they also have the right to do so free from the intru-
sion of the state.68
However, this right of private employers to control their op-
erations is not absolute. 69 The state can and does intervene to
regulate the operations of private employers. 70 The state, how-
ever, cannot intervene without a strong public policy justification
that affects the public good.71
Interfering with the rights of private employers to prohibit
breastfeeding at work arguably would serve no such public
good.72 It instead may likely have the negative effect of mandat-
ing disruptions at the workplace that would likely interfere with
productivity. In order to breastfeed at work, babies have to be at
the workplace. Smaller, more private workplace environments
are particularly vulnerable to the disruptions babies frequently
cause. Babies make noise.73 They cry, and often they cry
loudly.74 They also tend to spit up, particularly after they have
been fed.75 The smell of baby spit up can be unpleasant.76 When
67. See cases cited supra note 60.
68. See cases cited supra note 61.
69. See cases cited supra note 61.
70. See infra note 166 and accompanying text. The state not only intervenes in
private employment, it does so in the realm of work/family issues. For example, the
government has intervened in private employment on the issue of whether employ-
ees should have the right to take leave for family reasons through the Family and
Medical Leave Act. 29 U.S.C..§ 2601-2654 (2002).
71. Id.
72. While such policies would benefit individual mothers who choose to
breastfeed, they do not necessarily directly benefit the public broadly. Such policies
could only have a broad impact on the health and well-being of society if a great
number, or most, mothers choose to breastfeed. So they are not comparable to
other cases where the state has justifiably intervened to protect the public as a
whole. See generally Mountain States Tel. & Tel. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Wyo., 745
P.2d 563 (Wyo. 1987) (holding that the state could intervene to prevent monopolies
even though none was present here); Steffey v. City of Casper, 357 P.2d 456 (Wyo.
1961) (holding that the state can regulate private businesses to help equalize com-
petitive opportunities among businesses).
73. See MARY R. TULLEY & MARY L. OVERFIELD, BREASTFEEDING: A HAND-
BOOK FOR HOSPITALS 31 (1989).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 49.
76. See e.g., Donaldson v. Am. Banco Corp., 945 F. Supp. 1456, 1462 (D. Colo.
1996). This case provides examples of disruptive comments made to women after
they gave birth, began breastfeeding, and returned to work. One such comment
illustrates the disruptive smells associated with breastfeeding and baby spit-up. A
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mothers breastfeed, they have to hold babies, which can keep
them from using their hands to perform their work. 77 Addition-
ally, a woman's breast is exposed during breastfeeding. 78 Finally,
bringing babies into the work environment would expose them to
germs and potential infections, which could cause them to get
sick and cause their mothers to take time off of work to care for
them.79 The government arguably cannot interfere in private
employment policies and require that employers subject them-
selves to these types of productivity-inhibiting disruptions. 80
III. INACCURATE AND SPECIOUS JUSTIFICATIONS
These justifications for the state's failure to intervene in pri-
vate employment to eradicate penalties for workplace
breastfeeding are inaccurate and specious. The sanctions that re-
sult from a worker's decision to breastfeed are at least as severe,
if not more severe, than the criminal penalties imposed for public
breastfeeding. Moreover, the state has the authority to intervene
to change these penalties. Case law and legislation regarding
breastfeeding expose the state's affirmative, if unacknowledged,
use of this authority.
A. The Relative Severity of the Employment Sanctions for
Breastfeeding
Reasonable though it may seem, explaining the failure of the
law to protect women from employment sanctions for
breastfeeding at work by pointing to the relative severity of crim-
inal sanctions as compared to employment sanctions miscon-
strues the situation. Employment sanctions regarding
breastfeeding are at least as severe as, and arguably more severe
than, criminal sanctions. Employment sanctions force mothers to
fellow employee asked a co-worker: "Are you still breast feeding, Virginia? You
smell like curdled milk." Id. at 1462.
77. TULLEY & OVERFIELD, supra note 73, at 7.
78. See La Leche League International, FAQ on Discreet Breastfeeding, at http:/
/www.lalecheleague.org/FAQ/FAQdiscreet.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2001). Regard-
less of whether one condones the characterization of the female breast as a sexual
object, popular culture views it that way. Consequently, social mores require that a
woman's breasts be covered. See KATHERINE DETTWYLER, Beauty and the Breast,
in BREASTFEEDING: BIOCULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 174 (Patricia Stuart-Macadam &
Katherine A. Dettwyler, eds. 1995). Thus, uncovering the breast in the workplace
could offend co-workers because it would violate this social norm. Id.
79. La Leche League International, FAQ on Prevention of Illness, available at
http://lalecheleague.org/FAQ/prevention.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2001).
80. See cases cited supra note 61.
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choose whether to breastfeed or to be employed. Ultimately,
this prospect coerces female employees into "choosing" not to
breastfeed. By contrast, the potential for criminal sanctions if
one breastfeeds in public is merely a temporary limit on mobility.
It prohibits women from breastfeeding in certain public spaces.
This is a restriction they can easily circumvent by leaving the re-
stricted public space without any additional consequential penal-
ties, much unlike workplace sanctions for the same act.
For a number of decades, courts have recognized the idea
that employees are "captive" in their workplaces. 81 This concept
is not novel. It is simply an acknowledgement of the fact that
employers require that employees spend a certain amount of
time at work. 82 Acceptable as this policy may be, courts do rec-
ognize that it leaves employees vulnerable to exploitation be-
cause employers have a significant measure of control over the
actions of employees during this time.83 Moreover, many, if not
most, employees are dependent on their paychecks; for them,
having a job is a necessity. This situation leaves employers with
the power to impose restrictions on employees - even restric-
tions that impact employees' choices regarding their lives outside
of work. 84 Thus, courts, as well as the National Labor Relations
Board, have sought to protect employees from exploitation and
coercion due to this vulnerability that is incident to their status as
employees.85
Breastfeeding mothers, typically dependent on their jobs for
survival and unable to leave work during work hours, are captive
subjects of their employers' policies regarding breastfeeding at
work. Because infants must be fed every three to four hours,
81. See Raytheon Co. v. Int'l Union of Elec., Radio, and Mach. Workers, 160
N.L.R.B. 1603, 1610 (1966) (holding that the employer engaged in illegal captive
audience speeches just before a vote to unionize workers); Peerless Plywood Co. v.
United Furniture Workers of Am., 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953).
82. See cases cited supra note 81.
83. See cases cited supra note 61. Employers have the right to direct their busi-
nesses as they please free of state intervention absent a reason affecting the public
good. Employers can, then, control actions of employees without state regulation as
long as they are not violating the public good. See cases cited supra note 61.
84. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
85. See DOUGLAS E. RAY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING LABOR LAW § 4.3(C)(3)
(1999). See, e.g., NLRB v. Peerless Plywood Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953). The
court in Peerless prohibited speeches by employers within 24 hours of a union vote.
The speeches were deemed particularly egregious examples of employer coercion
because employees have no choice but to listen to them during work time, which can
cloud the employees' choice on the issue for the vote by limiting the time that em-
ployees have to assess the information provided by their employers. Id. at 429.
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employees who breastfeed must do so during business hours.86 If
a breastfeeding mother cannot breastfeed at work and she cannot
leave work, then she cannot breastfeed during work hours.
Prohibiting workplace breastfeeding can limit a woman's deci-
sion to breastfeed because employees who have chosen to
breastfeed their infants can do so only during certain hours of the
day, such as during non-working hours, and thus may not receive
the full benefits of breastfeeding that derive from having unlim-
ited time to breastfeed. 87 A woman's choice, then, is limited by
her status as a "captive" employee who cannot leave work to es-
cape workplace breastfeeding policies. 88
The way that employers frame their policies regarding work-
place breastfeeding can also effectively coerce a mother's choice
regarding breastfeeding. The employee's vulnerability to coer-
cion results from the timing of the situation. The employee typi-
cally asks for breastfeeding accommodations after she has
accepted employment.89 At this point, the employee has very
86. See TULLEY & OVERFIELD, supra note 73, at 32.
87. See id. at 49. The authors discuss whether bottle-feeding is an adequate
substitute for breastfeeding during a mother's work hours. Id. For a mother who
does not want to bottle-feed or whose baby will not bottle-feed, such a proposed
solution to bottle-feed rather than breastfeed at work continues to restrict a
mother's choice to either breastfeed or work. E.g., Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., 951
F.2d 351, 351 (W.D. Ky. 1991) (involving a baby that refused to take a bottle instead
of breastfeeding); see also, Dike v. Sch. Bd. of Orange County Fla., 650 F.2d 783
(Former 5th Cir. 1981). The mother in this case had her baby bottle-fed during the
day and she breastfed the baby when she returned home from work at night. Her
child, however, still felt the psychological effects of not being breastfed during the
day. These psychological effects could be observed. Thus, at least one of her rea-
sons for breastfeeding - to provide psychological comfort and stability to her child
- was undermined by her situation as a captive subject of her employer's policies.
Id. at 784.
88. The facts from Dike provide a glaring illustration of how captive a woman
can truly be in this situation. The mother involved in this case was a schoolteacher
who needed to breastfeed her baby because he developed "observable psychological
changes" after he began to take expressed breast milk from a bottle. Even though
the mother had a duty free lunch period in which she could breastfeed her child, her
employer still prohibited her from breastfeeding due to a school board policy
prohibiting teachers from bringing their own children to work. So, the mother had
her husband bring her child in a camper van to school so she could breastfeed him
there during her duty free period. The school board prohibited this activity too
because it violated a rule barring teachers from leaving the school premises during
the school day. Id. at 784.
89. See, e.g., Barrash v. Bowen, 846 F.2d 927, 928 (4th Cir. 1988) (involving a
mother who was employed with the Social Security Administration for over two
years when she requested leave to breastfeed her child); Pedrix-Wang v. Dir. Em-
ployment Servs. Dep't, 856 S.W.2d 636, 637 (Ark. App. 1993) (concerning a mother
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limited leverage to negotiate with her employer. 90 Thus, she is
vulnerable to being offered only limited accommodations, if any,
for her decision to breastfeed.91 Historically, employers have re-
sponded to requests for such accommodation with options that
are financially unworkable or detrimental to an employee's ca-
reer. 92 An employer's response to a woman's request to be al-
lowed to breastfeed at work, then, can leave a woman with a
coerced "choice." She can "choose" an option that will benefit
the financial viability of her career, or she can breastfeed. 93 She
can work to the fullness of her capacity and earning potential, or
she can breastfeed. She cannot do both.
The Supreme Court has held that forcing women into effec-
tively making this kind of choice between their control over their
bodies and lives and their employment is unconstitutional. 94 In
U.A.W. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., the Supreme Court held that a
workplace policy that prohibited women from working in posi-
tions that exposed them to lead unless the women were infertile
who had been employed by a chemical company for approximately one and a half
years when she requested workplace accommodations so she could breastfeed).
90. There are limited situations in which some employees may be able to negoti-
ate after they have accepted employment. In situations where employees are part of
unions, employees may be able to negotiate, through union representatives, with
their employer after their employment has commenced. See, e.g., Barrash, 846 F.2d
at 929 (recognizing that high-level employees may also have some semblance of bar-
gaining power); Martinez v. N.B.C., Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 305, 307 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(holding that a mother who worked as a television producer at MSNBC was able to
negotiate employment accommodations for her family demands).
91. See, e.g., Dike, 650 F.2d at 785 (involving an employer that told this mother
she could not breastfeed at work); Baker v. Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs., 685
N.E.2d 1325 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (involving an employer who had told a
breastfeeding mother that she could not breastfeed at work but instead could take a
six month leave or reduce her hours to part time).
92. See, e.g., Baker, 685 N.E.2d at 1326; see also Pedrix-Wang, 856 S.W.2d at 638
(involving an employer that offered a demotion to a woman who requested
breastfeeding accommodations at work).
93. The employer can frame the policy such that it imposes a significant disad-
vantage on women in the workplace that men simply do not have to confront. This
is analogous to Kathryn Abrams's description of the way sexual harassment operates
to the detriment of women in the workplace. Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurispru-
dence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1169 (1998). Abrams argues that
sexual harassment forces women to choose between self-protections and economic
opportunity. Id. at 1197. Framing the decision to breastfeed in such a way that it
forces women to choose either their health and the health of their child or their
economic viability, the employer can offer men a relative advantage in the work-
place. This advantage can help sustain male control over the workplace, which may
disadvantage women. Id.
94. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S 187, 206 (1991).
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facially discriminated against women. 95 The Court held that it
violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.96 It held that
plaintiffs like Mary Craig, who underwent a sterilization proce-
dure to avoid losing her job, could not be forced into making
such a choice. 97 The Court held that "women as capable of doing
their jobs as their male counterparts may not be forced to choose
between having a child and having a job. ' 98 In much the same
way that Mary Craig and her co-plaintiffs were illegally forced to
choose between their jobs and their fertility, breastfeeding
mothers are often forced to make a choice that is comparable to
that of Mary Craig and her co-plaintiffs. Both choices are forced
by employers. Both choices prevent a woman from making a
voluntary decision about her body. In both situations a woman
has to consider whether she can afford to lose her job if she de-
cides to makes a certain choice about her body. The difference
between these "choices" is that one choice regards the potential
to have children and the other regards the decision to provide
nutritional and health benefits to their children and themselves.
This latter choice is, then, arguably no less coercive or discrimi-
natory than the former.
Remarkably severe sanctions accompany either option -
work or breastfeed - even assuming that a mother can choose
and does not have to work instead of breastfeed for financial rea-
sons. If a woman refuses to accept an employer's ban on
breastfeeding and is fired, a stigma will attach. 99 She will likely
have to justify her decisions to subsequent potential employers
who may see her actions as nothing short of insubordination. 1°°
These potential employers may therefore hesitate or refuse to
employ her.1°1 A mother, then, faces the possibility of having
her freedom to choose her occupation partially or completely
limited, which is a sanction similar to the criminal penalties that
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 204.
98. Id.
99. Blackballing in the world of employment is real. See generally Barbara E.
Koh, Alterations Needed: A Study of the Disjunction Between the Legal Scheme and
Chinatown Garment Workers, 36 STAN. L. REV. 825 (1984) (discussing how
blackballing affects low-wage workers, such as garment industry workers). It also
impacts relatively high-wage workers such as attorneys. See Steve French, Pitfalls
and Possibilities: A Comprehensive Look at Female Attorneys and Law Firm Partner-
ships, 21 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 189, 212 (2000).
100. See French, supra note 99, at 212; Koh, supra note 99, at 844-45.
101. See Koh, supra note 99, at 844-45.
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restrict individuals' freedoms. 10 2 In addition to this sanction, a
breastfeeding employee can suffer another sanction that resem-
bles a criminal penalty. She may have to endure the monetary
sanction of lost wages. 103
The alternative - not breastfeeding children - cannot be
characterized as any less harsh. Indeed, its harshness can exceed
that of criminal sanctions because it punishes not only the
mother who cannot breastfeed because of workplace restrictions,
but also her child.104 Breastfeeding provides a number of health
and psychological benefits to both the mother10 5 and her
child.106 The employee who follows an employer's ban on
breastfeeding at work risks foregoing all of these benefits. 10 7
Criminal sanctions do not subject both convicted criminals and
102. See Burns v. Brinkley, 933 F. Supp. 528, 531-32 (E.D.N.C 1996) (holding
that there is a constitutional right to pursue work); Priddy v. City of Tulsa, 882 P.2d.
81, 84 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (holding that the right to obtain work is an inherent
liberty right).
103. E.g., Baker v. Ohio Bureau Employment Servs., 685 N.E.2d 1325 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1996). The appellant in Baker sought and was denied unemployment benefits
because her reason for leaving did not meet the "just cause" standard for voluntary
terminations. The employee was working when her employer told her that, in spite
of the fact that she could not afford a babysitter, the employer would not accommo-
date her child-care needs by allowing her to bring her children to work. Id. at 676-
77; see also Pedrix-Wang v. Dir., Employment Servs. Dep't 856 S.W.2d 636 (Ark.
App. 1993). Here the appellant sought review of her denial for unemployment com-
pensation. The court found that her reason for quitting her job did not meet the
"just cause" standard. This employee left work because her job exposed her to
chemicals that could make her breast milk unhealthy and her employer refused to
accommodate her request to limit her exposure to the chemicals at work. Id. at 637
104. This relative harshness of employment sanctions for breastfeeding is partic-
ularly apparent in comparison to the penalties for violating indecent exposure laws.
Violations of indecent exposure laws typically only constitute misdemeanor viola-
tions and so result in relatively small monetary fines or short jail sentences. See, e.g.,
D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1112 (1973); MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 750-335a (1970).
105. BLUEPRINT, supra note 8, at 10-11.
106. Lawrence, supra note 5, at 4-5; Horwood & Fergusson, supra note 7. Stud-
ies have found that breastfeeding cannot only increase the cognitive abilities of chil-
dren, but it also protects against life-long and life-threatening diseases. While the
physical health benefits of breastfeeding may still be achieved by bottle-feeding a
child, the immediate and long-term psychological benefits would be foregone if a
child were not breastfed. See Freed, supra note 4, at 243; see also supra text accom-
panying note 87.
107. While it is possible to pump breast milk so that infants can still obtain some
of the benefits of breast milk, they do not obtain all of the benefits. For example,
infants cannot pass germs to their mothers if they are not suckling from their breast.
Mothers, then, cannot help fight infections for their infants. La Leche League Inter-
national, supra note 79. Additionally, some babies simply will not take breast milk
from a bottle. See, e.g., Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., 951 F.2d. 351 (W.D. Ky. 1991).
The mother in this case needed to breastfeed because her child would not take a
bottle. Id. at 351.
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their children to health risks. 10 8 Employment policies that pro-
hibit workplace breastfeeding, however, can have this kind of pu-
nitive effect. They can punish both the breastfeeding mother and
her child by effectively denying them the many benefits of
breastfeeding. 109
Prohibitions on public breastfeeding do not limit or punish
women in the same way that employment sanctions do. If wo-
men are prohibited from breastfeeding in public, they do not
have to stay in those public areas. They have the option of going
elsewhere to breastfeed. Women, then, are not captive subjects
of state laws governing public spaces. Although the rules regard-
ing breastfeeding in public may be inconvenient, women can
work around them. Because they can freely leave the public
spaces where breastfeeding is prohibited, their choice to
breastfeed itself is not constrained. In contrast, women who
want to breastfeed in the workplace cannot avoid limitations on
their choice to breastfeed that private employment prohibitions
on breastfeeding impose. Thus, the effects of prohibitions on
workplace breastfeeding are arguably more severe than the sanc-
tions for and effects of any restrictions on public breastfeeding.
Such severe sanctions simply are not warranted for an act
that not only benefits two lives in terms of their health and well-
being,110 but also arguably implicates Constitutional privacy and
liberty interests.111 The Constitution protects the intimacy of the
marital relationship and parents' rights to direct the upbringing
of their children. Breastfeeding forms an intimate family rela-
tionship comparable to a marital relationship and implicates par-
ents' rights to make decisions regarding the upbringing of their
children. 112 As such, it has Constitutional implications and so is
an activity that has been inappropriately subjected to severe,
criminal-like sanctions." 3
108. LAFAVE, supra note 36, at 12-13.
109. See BLUEPRINT, supra note 8, at 10-11.
110. See id.; Lawrence, supra note 5, at 4-5; Harwood & Fergusson, supra note 7.
111. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Dike v. Sch. Bd. of Orange County Fla., 650 F.2d 783
(Former 5th Cir. 1981).
112. Dike, 650 F.2d at 787.
113. LAFAVE, supra note 36, at 22.
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B. The Established Authority of the State to Intervene in
Private Employers' Breastfeeding Policies: An
Illustration of the Work/Family Divide
The state also cannot justify its failure to provide protections
for workplace breastfeeding by asserting its lack of authority to
regulate private employment policies regarding breastfeeding.
The state already regulates private employment by reinforcing
bans on workplace breastfeeding. Moreover, the state intervenes
by actively promoting two mutually exclusive norms - the ideal-
worker and the ideal-mother norms - that exemplify the work/
family divide and serve to marginalize women from the work-
place. This subsection will begin by providing context on the
work/family divide and how it functions with respect to the ideal-
worker and ideal-mother norms. It will then offer examples of
case law and legislation that support the contention that the state
not only has the authority to intervene in private workplace poli-
cies regarding breastfeeding, but that it already does so in a way
that maintains the work/family divide.
1. The Work/Family Divide and the Ideal-Worker and Ideal-
Mother Paradigms
A number of feminists have written about the divide that
exists between the structures of work and family. 114 The work/
family divide centers on the notion that two separately function-
ing types of work exist: domestic work and paid work.115 This
understanding about work developed with industrialization,
which created paid employment opportunities outside of the
home."16 Paid work, valued by the wages offered for doing it,
came to be considered legitimate work."17 Men assumed the
available paid-worker roles and women remained in the domestic
sphere doing unpaid household and care-taking work."a8 Thus,
114. See, e.g., Nancy E. Dowd, Resisting Essentialism and Hierarchy: A Critique
of Work/Family Strategies for Women Lawyers, 16 HARV. BLACKLETrER L.J. 185
(2000); Maxine Eichner, Square Peg in a Round Hole: Parenting Policies and Liberal
Theory, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 133 (1998); Mary Joe Frug, A Postmodern Feminist Legal
Manifesto (an unfinished draft), 105 HARV. L. REV. 1045 (1992); Joan Williams,
Market Work and Family Work in the 21st Century, 44 VILL. L. REV. 305 (1999).
115. See ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, WOMEN HAVE ALWAYS WORKED 4 (1981).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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geography separated legitimate work from domestic work, and
gender separated legitimate workers from domestic workers. 119
This work/family divide still persists today.a20 The norms of
the ideal worker and the ideal mother exemplify the divide.' 2 '
These norms embody the quintessential roles associated with the
separate spheres of paid work and domestic, family work.
Exactly how the ideal worker is defined varies by the job. a2 2
It nevertheless has essential characteristics that transcend all job
types and levels.1 23 The ideal worker is always fully devoted to
the job during work hours.124 The ideal worker has no time for
childrearing while on the job and typically has very little time for
it during non-work hours.125 The ideal worker does not miss job-
related meetings.' 26 The ideal worker acquiesces to the concept
of "employer entitlement," the idea that employers are entitled
119. Id.
120. Women in popular culture continue to espouse the idea that work and fam-
ily are separate and that women bear the primary responsibility for child-care.
Movie star Jamie Lee Curtis, for example, recently announced that she may give up
her successful career to care for her children. Ms. Curtis noted her concern that
mothers are neglecting their roles in order to work. More Family Time, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, NC), March 8, 2001 at 2A. Moreover, studies show that wo-
men still spend twice as much time on child-care and household work as do men.
This suggests that regardless of whether they work, and especially if they do work,
women must still take care of the domestic and family needs. Work Force Develop-
ment, Mid-Career Women Face Distinct Challenges in Advancing Leadership, at
http://www.wfd.com/pressreleases/3fr.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2001).
121. See Joan Williams, Toward a Reconstructive Feminism: Reconstructing the
Relationship of Market Work and Family Work, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 89 (1998);
Adrien K. Wing & Laura Wesselmann, Transcending Traditional Notions of Mother-
ing: The Need for Critical Race Feminist Praxis, 5 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 257
(1999).
122. See Williams, supra note 121, at 95. Some of the characteristics of the ideal
worker norm, such as the necessary ability to travel, typically only apply to jobs that
pay high salaries and carry prestige, such as executive level jobs. Id. Yet, studies
have found that shift workers feel the burden of work/family conflicts acutely. Work
Force Development, Study Finds Corporate Work-Life Programs Fail to Meet the
Needs of Shiftworkers, at http://www.wfd.com/worklife/worklife.fr.htm (last visited
Feb. 18, 2001).
123. A recent study by the Dupont Corporation found that manufacturing work-
ers have numerous problems with the work/family balance, suggesting that they too
are held to the ideal worker norms to the detriment of family responsibilities. Work
Force Development, Dupont Study on Work-Life Initiatives, at http://www.wfd.com/
worklife/worklife.fr.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2001). The ideal worker norm and the
work/family conflicts it creates, then, are by no means limited to upper echelon em-
ployment positions.
124. See PATRICIA A. McBROOM, THE THIRD SEX 27 (1992); Williams, supra
note 121, at 95.
125. See Williams, supra note 121, at 95.
126. Id.
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to demand that their workers comply with the ideal-worker para-
digm while they work. 127
Similarly, the ideal-mother norm encompasses a number of
qualities that apply to all women but are particularly onerous for
women of minority or low-income status.128 The ideal mother is
female; that is, the ideal prescribes the notion that only women
can truly fulfill its requirements. 129 The ideal mother spends all
of her time selflessly devoted to her child(ren). 130 She is the pri-
mary caretaker of those children. 131 In much the same way that
ideal workers acquiesce to employers' expectations of entitle-
ment, the ideal mother acquiesces to the notion that her children
are entitled to her devotion and her time. 32
Notably, the significant aspects of the ideal-worker and the
ideal-mother norms are largely the same. The ideal-worker and
ideal-mother paradigms both require devotion by the ideal
worker and the ideal mother to those persons - employers and
children, respectively - entitled to their service.133 A woman
cannot be an ideal mother, unreservedly devoting herself full
time to her children, however, and simultaneously devote her un-
divided attention to her job during work hours. One simply can-
not be completely devoted to two things at once. 34 Thus,
women cannot be both ideal workers and ideal mothers. 135 The
ideals, then, are mutually exclusive. Consequently, mothers who
work inevitably fall short of both the ideals.
127. Id.
128. Wing & Wesselmann, supra note 121, at 273. Black mothers have tradition-
ally been considered the "epitome of bad mothers." Id. at 259. They are held to the
ideal-mother standard even though they are almost inevitably doomed to fall short
because they are forced to participate in strenuous, low wage (or in the period of
slavery, no wage) work. A study reported by Work Force Development also found
that female shift workers, when compared to all employees, are three times as likely
to be single parents. Work Force Development, supra note 122. Shift workers who
are also mothers are more likely, therefore, to be solely responsible for financially
supporting their children. They cannot live up then to the ideal-mother norm. Id.
129. Wing & Wesselmann, supra note 121, at 258.
130. McBROOM, supra note 124, at 118.
131. Naomi R. Kahn, Gendered Identities: Women and Household Work, 44 VILL.
L. REv. 525, 528 (1999).
132. McBROOM, supra note 124, at 118.
133. See McBROOM, supra note 124, at 118; see also supra text accompanying
notes 122, 123.
134. Eichner, supra note 114, at 146-147.
135. See Williams, supra note 114, at 314 (asserting that the economic realm has
been divided into "mothers and others").
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2. Supporting the Work/Family Divide and the Ideal-Worker
and Ideal-Mother Paradigms Through State
Interference in Private Workplace Breastfeeding
Policies
The state has supported this work/family divide and the cor-
responding ideal-worker and ideal-mother paradigms through
both case law and legislation governing workplace breastfeeding.
The language and holdings of two cases unambiguously depict
how the state has intervened in private employment to support
prohibitions on workplace breastfeeding. 136 They further show
that the state promotes the work/family divide as well as the
ideal-worker and ideal-mother paradigms.
In Baker v. Ohio Bureau of Employment Services,137 a
mother appealed denial of unemployment compensation by the
Ohio Bureau of Employment Services. She applied for unem-
ployment compensation after she quit her job as an office man-
ager because her employer told her that she could neither
breastfeed her infant child at work nor allow her teenage chil-
dren to come to work during after-school hours.138 Under Ohio
law, an individual who has voluntarily terminated her own em-
ployment without "just cause" is not entitled to unemployment
compensation.139 Upholding the Bureau's denial of benefits, the
Ohio Court of Appeals stated that the mother's reasons for quit-
ting her job did not constitute just cause. 140 The court held that
the employee's reasons for leaving her job did not meet this stan-
dard because her employer offered her temporary leave or part-
time work to deal with her child care concerns and she refused to
accept either option.141
In making this determination, the court failed to consider
important issues regarding this employee's situation. Her finan-
cial constraints would likely have prevented her from accepting
the employer's offer for leave or part-time work.142 She only
made $4.75 per hour, the minimum wage. Yet she had to support
136. Baker v. Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs., 685 N.E.2d 1325 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1996); Pedrix-Wang v. Dir., Employment Serv. Dep't, 856 S.W.2d 636 (Ark.
App. 1993).
137. Baker, 685 N.E.2d. at 1326.
138. Id.
139. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 4141.29(D)(2)(a) (Baldwin 2001).
140. Baker, 685 N.E.2d at 1327.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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herself and her three children. 143 She could not have done that
by reducing her hours in half at this wage since, as her employer
was aware, she could not have even afforded to pay for a babysit-
ter with her full-time wages. 144 A six-month leave of absence
would have been equally unfeasible. Her child-care responsibili-
ties simply would not have ended after six months. The court not
only failed to consider these aspects of the mother's case, but it
also implied that her failure to accept the employer's proposals
constituted a rejection of all reasonable options. The court stated
that these options amounted to an offer of "everything possible
to accommodate" the mother and that the mother's rejection of
them proved that she "did not desire in any way to accommodate
her employer. 1 45 In other words, the court suggested that, even
though the employer did no more than offer options that would
continue to keep family and work separate, the employer went
beyond the call of duty and did everything imaginable to accom-
modate the mother.
These options offered her, however, did not constitute all
that the employer could have done to accommodate the mother.
The employer could have accommodated her family demands at
work while letting her continue to work full time. This employer
could have continued to allow her to bring her children to work
and breastfeed her baby there. Also, the employer could have
entered into a discussion with her regarding compromise solu-
tions to the situation. The court, though, never considered these
alternatives and thereby sent an unmistakable message: if a
mother wants to devote herself to her children, she cannot do it
on work time. She cannot be an ideal worker and an ideal
mother at the same time because work concerns and family con-
cerns are distinct. If she wants to care for her children, she must
leave the workspace to do so even if that means she will be leav-
ing permanently.
In Pedrix-Wang v. Director, Employment Services Depart-
ment,146 Jolie Pedrix-Wang also appealed her denial of unem-
ployment compensation after she quit her job as a chemist at
Cyro Industries (Cyro). Arkansas unemployment law states that
employees who voluntarily terminate their employment must do
so with "good cause connected to work" in order to be eligible
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. 856 S.W.2d 636 (Ark. App. 1993).
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for unemployment compensation. 147 The court found that Ms.
Pedrix-Wang did not quit with the requisite good cause. Ms.
Pedrix-Wang left her job at Cyro because she was breastfeeding
her baby and her job exposed her to certain chemicals that could
compromise the integrity of her breast milk. 148 When Ms.
Pedrix-Wang asked Cyro to make accommodations in her work
as a chemist so that she could avoid contact with these chemicals,
Cyro refused even though it had restricted her prenatal exposure
to these chemicals. 149 Instead, Cyro offered Ms. Pedrix-Wang
two other options. 150 Cyro informed her that she could stop
breastfeeding and return to her job as a chemist without restric-
tions on her exposure to these chemicals.151 Alternately, she
could take a lower-level position available at Cyro that did not
entail exposure to chemicals. a52 Taking this position meant ac-
cepting a demotion as well as a change to twelve-hour work
shifts. 153 Finding both of these options unacceptable, Ms. Pedrix-
Wang quit. 154
Asserting that the Board of Employment Services reasona-
bly concluded that these justifications for quitting did not consti-
tute good cause connected to work, the Court of Appeals made it
clear that Cyro asked nothing unusual of Ms. Pedrix-Wang. 155 In
spite of the fact that the employer's failure to provide any accom-
modations to prevent the endangerment of the health of Ms.
Pedrix-Wang's child was the direct cause of her voluntary termi-
nation, the court determined that this problem was a personal,
147. ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-10-513 (1987).
148. Pedrix-Wang, 856 S.W.2d at 637.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 638.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 640. Significantly, the facts of this case closely parallel the facts of
U.A. W. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S 187 (1991). In both cases, employers
forced employees to choose between their jobs and the health of their children or
potential children. In both cases, the employees faced severe repercussions for their
choices. The difference in these cases, however, is that the Supreme Court held such
a choice to be unlawful in Johnson Controls and the Arkansas Court of Appeals did
not in Pedrix-Wang.
154. Pedrix-Wang, 856 S.W.2d at 638.
155. Stating that Cyro had "attempted to accommodate her by offering her an-
other position," the court implies that Cyro's offers were reasonable. In doing so,
though, the court ignores that the "accommodations" amounted to a demotion,
which left Ms. Pedrix-Wang to choose between her job and the benefits of
breastfeeding her child. Id.
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not a work-related, cause for terminating her employment.15 6 In
doing so the court assumed that a cause could not be both per-
sonal and work-related. Thus, the court promoted a particular
view of the relationship between work and family - a divided
one. The court asserted that personal, family problems, even
those with workplace-related causes, do not deserve workplace
accommodations. 157 Moreover, it suggested that an employee
who asks the workplace to breach the work/family divide by re-
questing that the workplace limit its negative impact on the fam-
ily makes an unjustifiable demand on the workplace. 158 Thus,
the Arkansas Court of Appeals also took a position on whether
the ideal worker can also be the ideal mother: she cannot be
both. If the workplace can justifiably deny her accommodations
that would allow her to be an ideal mother while she works, then
she cannot be both the ideal worker and the ideal mother. Ideal
mothers then can be, and are, marginalized from the ideal-
worker role and the workplace.
It can be argued that these cases are nothing more than ex-
amples of the government refusing to intervene in the policies of
private employers by letting employers formulate policies as they
see fit. The courts do not, though, state this non-intervention
policy and then refrain from commenting on the work/family pol-
icies. Instead, they affirmatively support policies that keep paid
work and family work separate and that favor the traditional
ideal worker norm. In both Baker and Pedrix-Wang, moreover,
the state denied breastfeeding mothers any support for work-
place breastfeeding by denying them unemployment compensa-
tion.159 In both Baker and Pedrix-Wang, then, the courts were
not only supporting the private employers' decisions to divide
family and work, they were affirming state action to separate
156. The court calls Ms. Pedrix-Wang's decision an "entirely personal one." Id.
Its basis for making this conclusion is that Ms. Pedrix-Wang's decision was not the
result of any doctor's order. Instead, her own research led her to decide to
breastfeed. Id. The doctor's order would not make her decision to quit, however,
any more closely connected to work. The court fails to note this problem in its
definition of a "personal" decision as one not related to work, thus suggesting that
its logic was forced so that it could conclude that these family concerns could justifi-
ably be considered exclusive of work-related concerns.
157. Id. at 639.
158. The court insists that personal issues, however admirable, do not constitute
legitimate reasons to quit work. So, Cyro was justified in its actions regarding Ms.
Pedrix-Wang. Id.
159. Baker v. Ohio Bureau of Employment Servs., 685 N.E.2d 1325, 1326-27
(Ohio Ct. App. 1996); Pedrix-Wang, 856 S.W.2d at 639.
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family and work in the private workplace.' 60 That the states' in-
terventions served to affirmatively reinforce the status quo does
not change the fact that the state's actions were policy
interventions.
The state also intervenes in private employment policies re-
garding breastfeeding through legislative action. Legislation re-
garding breastfeeding in public evidences both state support for
the ideal-mother norm as well as state assertions about what pri-
vate workplace policies regarding mothers should be. 161 By
decriminalizing breastfeeding and concurrently promoting it
through public-policy statements and government-sponsored
campaigns, 162 the state makes an assertion about who the ideal
mother is: the ideal mother is a mother who breastfeeds. Be-
cause an ideal mother cannot be an ideal worker, particularly if
she chooses to breastfeed, state support of breastfeeding
amounts to state support of women acting as ideal mothers and
not as ideal workers. 163 Because women who are not ideal work-
ers are excluded form the workplace,164 this legislation also
serves to support the marginalization of women in the work-
place. 165 It excludes breastfeeding mothers and other non-ideal
workers from the work sphere and consigns them to the domestic
sphere.
IV. A NEW WORKPLACE, A NEW WORKER, AND A
GENDER-NEUTRAL CARETAKER
The state's actions that support and promote prohibitions on
workplace breastfeeding evidence its authority to intervene in
private employment with respect to breastfeeding policies specif-
160. Baker, 685 N.E.2d at 1326-27; Pedrix-Wang, 856 S.W.2d at 639.
161. See generally sources cited supra notes 23-24, 26, 30-31.
162. See 42 U.S.C. § 1790(b)(3) (1994); BLUEPRINT, supra note 8, 3-4.
163. Fifteen states still include the breast implicitly or expressly in their indecent
exposure laws and, therefore, potentially include breastfeeding in those criminal
laws. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-1402 (1983); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-8 (1996);
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-4-1 (Michie 1997); MASS. GEN. LAWS 272 § 16 (1987);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 97-29-31 (1971); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-4-201 (Michie 1982). In
these states the ideal mother is not only not an ideal worker, she is completely rele-
gated to the private sphere of the home.
164. See Eichner, supra note 114, at 147-48.
165. State support of breastfeeding is not negative state action in an absolute
sense. It is negative because it conflicts with the ideal-worker paradigm and thus
supports mothers' marginalization in the workplace. If the ideal-worker norm were
redefined such that it considered family responsibilities, this effect could be avoided.
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ically and work/family policies generally.1 66 Instead of using this
authority to prohibit breastfeeding, however, the state should use
this authority to support it. Moreover, the state should exercise
this authority more broadly to attack the work/family divide and
to reformulate the ideal-worker norm so that it accommodates
workers' care-taking responsibilities. These changes, though, will
only come about when cultural reforms in the workplace and le-
gal reforms occur. Thus, a picture of what these reforms should
look like needs to be explored along with strategies for achieving
these reforms.
A. Cultural Reforms
Workplaces can begin to dismantle the work/family divide
by permitting breastfeeding at work and by allowing breastfeed-
ing mothers to bring their children to work. Furthermore, work-
places should give mothers the choice to keep their children with
them in their workspaces or to have them cared for in an on-site
day care facility.167 The workplace should also allow women to
breastfeed in their workspaces if that is feasible.1 68 Doing so
would not cause disruptions to workplace productivity; it is en-
tirely possible to breastfeed discreetly and non-disruptively. 169
166. Significantly, the state has intervened in private employers' policies regard-
ing work/family issues in a number of contexts. The Supreme Court decision in
Johnson Controls illustrates the state's authority to intervene on behalf of women
who are coerced into a choice between their bodies, childbirth and child rearing and
their jobs. U.A.W. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991). The Family and
Medical Leave Act (FMLA) illustrates another instance of such government inter-
ference. 29 U.S.C. § 2601-2654 (Supp. 1977). The stated purposes of the FMLA
include promoting "national interests in preserving family integrity" and helping
families "balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of families." 29
U.S.C. § 2601 (Supp. 1977). Through legislation, then, the state not only determines
what "family integrity" is but also demonstrates that it can intervene in conflicts
between work and family.
167. Workplace accommodations of this sort are not unheard of. San Jose Na-
tional Bank, for example, instituted a program that allows mothers to bring their
babies into their workspaces until they begin to crawl or until they reach six months
of age, whichever comes first. Marion Crain, Where Have All the Cowboys Gone?
Marriage and Breadwinning in Postindustrial Society, 60 OHIO STATE L.J. 1877, 1957
(1999).
168. DETTWYLER, supra note 78, at 193.
169. There are a number of techniques that can be used to make breastfeeding
unobtrusive. Moreover, infants are least likely to be disruptive when they are feed-
ing. La Leche League International, supra note 78. Although some infants do have
a tendency to spit up following feedings, which can result in unpleasant after-smells,
this reaction can be avoided. Additionally, mothers do not have to have their move-
ments or activities constrained by breastfeeding. The mother's breast also does not
have to be exposed during breastfeeding. Id. Finally, the risk of babies becoming ill
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The workplace should nevertheless also provide women with the
option of breastfeeding in an alternative, private space in the
workplace. 170 These changes would not only help to accommo-
date mothers' breastfeeding needs, but they would also help to
ensure that women have choices regarding breastfeeding
generally. 171
While necessary, changes that accommodate breastfeeding
in the workplace absent any other accommodations for work/
family conflicts offer only a partial solution to the problem of the
work/family divide. Accommodating workplace breastfeeding
alone would constitute an accommodation for just one tempo-
rally limited aspect of female workers' care-taking responsibili-
ties.172  Furthermore, this unilateral focus would fail to
encourage men to take responsibility for care-taking concerns
and so would allow them to continue to devote themselves to
paid work and to achieving the status of the traditional ideal
worker.173 Reforms focused on workplace breastfeeding policies
due to exposure to germs, bacteria, and viruses in the workplace environment is
actually counteracted by breastfeeding. La Leche League International, supra note
79. Thus, the risk of illness due to exposure to antigens in the workplace is not
particularly significant when breastfeeding is available as a method to fight them.
Id. The state, then, can intervene in private employment regarding the issue of
breastfeeding without creating negative, disruptive effects in the work environment.
170. Such accommodations have historical precedent. During World War II, em-
ployers hired women because of the shortage of male workers. Employers helped
women balance work and family by providing care-taking assistance, including nur-
series for children and flexible work hours. KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 115, at
141-42. These accommodations, though, are not merely relics of the past. They con-
tinue to occur. For example, a Texas organization called TG3 set up a separate
space near employees' workspaces where their infants could stay until they begin to
crawl. Crain, supra note 167, at 1957.
171. These kinds of changes must take care to avoid essentialism. They should
not amount to the maternalization of the woman's body. They must recognize that
some women do not want to have children, cannot physically bear them, or cannot
financially support them and so should not create a mandate for motherhood or
breastfeeding. MARY JOE FRUG, A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto, in
POSTMODERN LEGAL FEMINISM 138-140 (1992) (an unfinished work). The work-
place, then, must clearly define these choices as that - choices.
172. Child rearing responsibilities simply do not end with breastfeeding. Work-
ers' care-taking responsibilities, moreover, are not limited to child rearing. In a
study conducted by the DuPont Corporation, sixteen percent of employees reported
eldercare responsibilities. Work Force Development, supra note 123.
173. Currently, women continue to bear a disproportionate amount of the care-
taking responsibilities. Williams, supra note 114, at 309. According to Williams,
women bear the responsibility for eighty percent of the child-care duties and two-
thirds of the housework duties in America today, which frees men to dedicate them-
selves to their work. Id.
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alone, then, would only have a limited effect on the work/family
divide and would do little to reformulate the ideal worker norm.
Breaking down the work/family divide and reformulating
the ideal-worker norm can happen if the ideal-mother norm is
replaced-by a new, gender-neutral ideal: the care-taker norm. 174
If care-taking becomes gender-neutral, all workers will have con-
flicts between paid work and care-taking responsibilities. If all
workers have these conflicts, the ideal-worker norm will have to
be reformulated to account for the varied care-taking responsi-
bilities of workers, and employers will have to begin to accom-
modate their employees' care-taking responsibilities.
Accommodations should include a shift in workplace norms so
that productivity is measured by outcomes instead of by the num-
ber of hours workers spend in the workplace. Doing so will al-
low workers to have the flexible working hours that they would
all need to accommodate both their paid work and care-taking
responsibilities. 175
B. Legal Reforms
Legal reforms can encourage and compel these cultural
changes. These legal reforms should take the form of state public
policy statements in favor of breastfeeding, an expansion of un-
employment compensation coverage to include terminations
from work due to care-taking responsibilities, and state and fed-
eral statutory protections and mandated workplace accommoda-
tions for workers' care-taking responsibilities.
Employees who have been terminated from work because
they breastfeed can assert a claim for wrongful discharge against
their employers under current law. They can claim that their em-
174. Nancy E. Dowd has written about just such a model. Her ideas provide a
useful place to begin the redefinition process. She argues that the caretaker role
needs to be taken out of the context of gender. It needs to be family based. The
definition of family, however, also has to be reconsidered so that it is more inclusive
of all care-taking relationships. To do so, it must be defined by relationships instead
of structures, and no one family type can have primacy over another. Only then can
the definitions of family and care-taker avoid even inadvertent slips into ethnocen-
trism, racism, or sexism. NANCY E. DOWD, IN DEFENSE OF SINGLE-PARENT FAMI-
LIES 155-58 (1997).
175. Even workers who must remain in their workspaces to accomplish their
work could benefit from such flexible schedules if their management would, as it
should, juggle their schedules and shifts so that work hours are covered and workers
still have the option of flexible hours. A shift juggling system like the one proposed
here was implemented during World War II to help accommodate workers' care-
taking responsibilities. KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 115, at 141.
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ployers terminated their employment in violation of public policy
in federal law that supports breastfeeding.176 Some state courts,
though, refuse to recognize wrongful discharge claims based on
public policy statements in federal law; they will only recognize
wrongful discharge claims if they are based on a violation of state
public policy.177 States should, therefore, pass legislation that de-
fines breastfeeding as an important public policy so that wrongful
discharge claims could rely on pro-breastfeeding policies in both
state and federal statutes. 178
Legal reforms should also include an expansion of states'
unemployment insurance laws so that they cover workers whose
jobs have been voluntarily and involuntarily terminated because
of their care-taking responsibilities. In the context of voluntary
terminations, all states require that employees demonstrate that
they have terminated their employment for "good cause" or
"good cause related to employment" in order to receive bene-
fits.179 Changes to states' unemployment compensation statutes
should, then, explicitly include voluntarily terminating employ-
ment to attend to care-taking responsibilities as part of the defi-
nition of "good cause" or "good cause related to employment."
In the context of involuntary terminations, employees must show
that their employment was terminated through no fault of their
own. 180 So, unemployment statutes regarding involuntary termi-
nation should state that employees who have had their employ-
ment involuntary terminated solely because of their care-taking
responsibilities are not at fault for their terminations. "Care-tak-
ing" should include breastfeeding, breast pumping, child-care
when the employer has failed to provide reasonable, viable assis-
tance with child-care, and elder-care.
Legal reforms should not only compensate employees who
have quit or who have been fired because of breastfeeding or
other care-taking responsibilities; they should also compel em-
ployers to accommodate workers' breastfeeding and general
care-taking responsibilities in the workplace. Federal and state
statutes can encourage and compel employers to make these ac-
commodations. These changes should include an expansion of
176. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 65, at 700. The federal Child Nutrition Act
states that breastfeeding should be promoted because it is "the best method of infant
nutrition." 42. U.S.C. §1790(a)(1994).
177. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 65, at 700.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 778.
180. Id. at 771.
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the Fair Labor Standards Act to establish flexible work schedul-
ing and mandated breaks for care-taking responsibilities, includ-
ing breastfeeding. 181 The federal government as well as the
states should offer tax breaks to businesses that provide day-care
facilities in the workplace. 182 States should also follow Hawaii's
example and enact statutes that define workplace penalties for
breastfeeding as unlawful discrimination. 183 States should, how-
ever, enhance these statutory protections by defining workplace
penalties imposed upon workers solely because of their care-tak-
ing responsibilities as unlawful and discriminatory. 84
C. Allies for Reform: Collaborating to Help Break Down the
Work/Family Divide and Reformulate the Worker and
Mother Norms
Imagining such legal reform and compelling it are two decid-
edly different issues. Any woman, public policy organization that
works towards making gains for women's rights, or lobbying
group that focuses on women's issues and is interested in this
type of reform should contemplate aligning with powerful, if cu-
rious, groups. Collaborations with strong lobbying groups with
vested interests in the benefits of care-taking should be consid-
ered as a means to achieving these changes. Collaborations with
employers, insurance companies, and groups such as the Ameri-
can Association of Retired Persons (AARP), for example,
should be explored.
Employers could be tapped as allies in these efforts since
they stand to benefit from employees whose children are health-
181. The purpose of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) is to provide mini-
mum standards to protect workers. Id. at 261. It is, then, the appropriate tool to use
to provide workers with minimum accommodations for their work and care-taking
responsibilities. Just as the FLSA can require employers to pay overtime wages to
employees who work over forty hours per week, it can require employers to provide
employees with flexible work hours and care-taking breaks. Id.
182. Congress has the authority to offer tax exemptions that serve a public pur-
pose. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 588 (1983) (accommodating
care-taking needs of workers and their children arguably serves a public purpose in
the same way that tax exemptions to non-profit day-care organizations also serve a
public purpose).
183. HAw. REV. STAT. § 378-2 (1991).
184. States protecting care-taking responsibilities in this way would have to es-
tablish guidelines or mechanisms such that it would be clear that the sole cause of
the workplace penalty was a worker's efforts to fulfill care-taking responsibilities.
Thus, if a worker's efforts to fulfill care-taking responsibilities also caused the
worker to fail to accomplish an employment task, then any consequential penalty
would not result solely because of worker's care-taking responsibility.
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ier because they were breastfed. 185 Because breastfed children
do not get sick as often as non-breastfed children, parents of
breastfed children do not need to take time off of work to care
for them. 186 These parents, then, do not sacrifice productivity to
care for their children. Thus, employers would benefit from
breastfeeding initiatives and work-family accommodations be-
cause they would help maintain productivity levels among work-
ers. Moreover, work-family accommodations are also likely to
increase the retention rates of employees, which can only benefit
employers financially.
Alliances with insurance companies should also be explored.
Insurance companies would benefit financially from workplace
policies supporting breastfeeding at work because effectively
supporting a disease-fighting mechanism for workers' children
would result in a decrease in the number of claims filed on behalf
of employees' children. 187 Since employers pay the premiums
on their employees' insurance policies regardless of the number
of claims they file, a decrease in claims would amount to a de-
crease in the amount of money insurance companies pay out
without any necessary, concurrent decrease in the amount of
money they receive from insurance premium payments.188
The American Association of Retired Persons (AARP)
could also be tapped as an ally in lobbying for new care-taker-
worker legislation since it is concerned with eldercare needs.' 89
Its stated goals of finding solutions to eldercare and long-term
185. See BLUEPRINT, supra note 8, at 10-11; Lawrence, supra note 5, at 4-5.
186. See BLUEPRINT, supra note 8, at 10-11; Lawrence, supra note 5, at 4-5.
187. Gordon G. Waggett & Regl R. Waggett, Breast Is Best: Legislation Support-
ing Breast-feeding is an Absolute Bare Necessity - A Model Approach, 6 MD. J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 71 (1995). The authors state that breastfeeding can save
millions of dollars in insurance, welfare and medical care costs. Id. at 76.
188. This tactic needs to be applied cautiously. Once persuaded that they can
benefit financially from pro-breastfeeding initiatives, insurance companies could
conceivably turn the initiatives into a mandate for breastfeeding that would serve to
maternalize the female body and limit women's choices. See Frug, supra note 171, at
138-140; supra text accompanying note 171. Because they are such potentially
strong allies in the effort to develop workplace accommodations for breastfeeding,
they should not be abandoned because of this potentiality. Instead, the alliance
should be coupled with consistent feminist advocacy against the maternalization of
the female body. Id.
189. American Association of Retired Persons, The Public Policy Agenda 2000,
available at http://www.aarp.org (last visited Mar. 20, 2001). The American Associa-
tion of Retired Persons (AARP) has stated goals to work for the passage of legisla-
tion regarding effective care for the retired and elderly populations. American
Association of Retired Persons, The Public Policy Agenda 2000, Chapter 7: Long-
Term Care, available at http://www.aarp.org (last visited Mar. 20, 2001).
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care problems would be furthered by advocating for changes to
the workplace such as outcome-based programs and flextime pol-
icies. 190 Because these policies would accommodate the care-
taking responsibilities of workers regardless of whom they are
caring for, the elderly would benefit from them.
CONCLUSION
The Essay has not only attempted to wrestle with
breastfeeding policies, it has also sought to do so in light of
broader policy concerns regarding the work/family divide and the
ideal-worker and ideal-mother paradigms. By focusing on why
the government can and should intervene to rework these poli-
cies and paradigms in the private employment sphere, this Essay
has sought to further the discussion on how to effect change. It
has also sought to explore ways to compel government action to
effectively break down the work/family divide and the ideal-
mother norm and to simultaneously reformulate the ideal-
worker norm. These kinds of changes center on helping women
like the teacher who so dismayed my classmates by breastfeeding
at work. As the law reflects, my classmates' attitudes are not
unique. Their attitudes are rooted in cultural norms. Changing
their attitudes and others like them, therefore, will require broad
shifts in the cultural norms. While the law cannot mandate such
broad cultural changes, it can open the door to them and begin to
change them. The changes suggested in this Essay constitute an
attempt to determine how to do that.
190. American Association of Retired Persons, The Public Policy Agenda 2000,
Chapter 7: Long-Term Care, available at http://www.aarp.org (last visited Mar. 20,
2001). Outcome-based work policies focus on the work product an employee puts
out instead of on the hours an employee spends working. Work policies that focus
on output instead of hours would, by their very nature, offer employees some of the
flexibility they need to address care-taking responsibilities. Policies that allow for
the shift juggling system implemented in World War II to assist working mothers or
that provide employees with the option of working from home would benefit em-
ployees with elder-care responsibilities as well as those with child-care responsibili-
ties. See Kessler-Harris, supra note 115, at 141-142; see also supra text
accompanying note 170.
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